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Abstract Researchers have iterated that the future of
synthetic biology and biotechnology lies in novel con-
sumer applications of crossing biology with engineering.
However, if the new biology’s future is to be sustainable,
early and serious efforts must be made towards social
sustainability. Therefore, the crux of new applications of
synthetic biology and biotechnology is public understand-
ing and acceptance. The RASVaccine is a novel recombi-
nant design not found in nature that re-engineers a com-
mon bacteria (Salmonella) to produce a strong immune
response in humans. Synthesis of the RASVaccine has the
potential to improve public health as an inexpensive, non-
injectable product. But how can scientists move forward
to create a dialogue of creating a ‘common sense’ of this
new technology in order to promote social sustainability?
This paper delves into public issues raised around these
novel technologies and uses the RASVaccine as an exam-
ple of meeting the public with a common sense of its
possibilities and limitations.
Keywords Biotechnology . Ethics . Legal issues . Social
aspects . Society . Societal values . Trust . Vaccine .
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Introduction
The last decades, many advances in biology have been
boosted by crossing biology with engineering. Recombi-
nant DNA techniques have made this possible, and are a
technical foundation for the creation of new products,
which may be aimed to benefit society. An example of this
lies in the design, development and creation of vaccines.
Vaccines, especially in the United States, can be a
very contentious object in societal circles, although their
benefits have proven to be very effective for overall
public health. This is partially due to societal values. It
is therefore important that research products, whether
they be vaccines or among the plethora of other methods
or products, whose goal is to improve society in one
way or another, take seriously the idea of ‘social sus-
tainability’. But how?
Nanoethics (2014) 8:179–185
DOI 10.1007/s11569-014-0198-6
D. J. Dankel (*) :A. Delgado : R. Strand
The Centre for the Study of the Science and the Humanities,
University of Bergen, Allégaten 34, Post Box 7805,
5020 Bergen, Norway
e-mail: dorothy.dankel@svt.uib.no
K. L. Roland :M. Fisher :K. Brenneman : J. Clark-Curtiss :
R. Curtiss III
The Biodesign Institute, Center for Infectious Diseases and
Vaccinology, Arizona State University, 1001 S McAllister
Avenue, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA
J. Santander
Nucleus for Microbiology and Immunity, Center for
Genomics and Bioinformatics and The School of Life
Sciences, Universidad Mayor, Chile and Arizona State
University, Camino la Piramide 5750,
Huechuraba 8580745, Chile
C.<. Baek
Synthetic Biology R&D, Bioscience Division, Life Science
Solutions Group (LSG), Thermo Fisher Scientific, 5791 Van
Allen Way, Carlsbad, CA 92008, USA
e-mail: ChangHo.Baek@thermofisher.com
This paper is an academic contribution of how the
life sciences and humanities can describe and frame, and
thus understand, their products of research with and for
society. The first part of this paper reviews public trust
and distrust in society. We then use the case of the
Recombinant Attenuated Salmonella Vaccine to illus-
trate how scientists can respond to societal questions of
value as first steps to dialoguing with society for bio-
technologies that are socially and scientifically robust.
Making Common Sense of Vaccines: Public Trust
and Distrust in Science
There are several sources of public trust in science. First,
the public may see science and the scientific method as a
provider and guarantor of truth or at least valid, reliable
and objective knowledge. Second, they may experience
that science helps them meet their needs and improves
health and welfare. Third, the scientific ethos invites
trust: the honest, open, unselfish and self-critical pursuit
of knowledge for the common good [1, 2].
Sources of distrust are equally many. The history of
vaccines is riddled with public controversies from its
inception until today. For instance, through miscommu-
nication or blatant falsification of data the notion that the
measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine causes autism
in children has become pervasive, resulting in fewer
parents vaccinating their children [3–5]. Similarly, con-
troversy over the anthrax vaccine has prompted many
armed servicemen and women to decline vaccination
[6–8]. From the perspective of scientists, vaccine oppo-
nents may occasionally appear as misinformed and igno-
rant1,2 [9]. If we take the perspective of the opponents,
however, the distrust can be quite understandable. They
or their child may have experienced something they
believe to be an adverse effect of the vaccine, as in the
well-publicized Jenny McCarthy case,3,4,5. Vaccine dis-
senters may have encountered disagreement or conflict-
ing messages from different physicians, or arrogant
representatives of the medical and scientific community
when raising their issues. Theymay also beworried about
the economic or political dimensions of vaccine pro-
grams, in particular if the distrust in science is linked to
a similar distrust in government. In such a situation, there
might be a need to improve public understanding of the
technicalities of science. We believe, however, that there
is an equal need to improve scientists’ understanding of
how the different publics perceive the broader issues in
which science is an element. Accordingly, in this paper
we introduce the notion of ‘common sense’. The Cam-
bridge Dictionary definition of common sense is: ‘the
basic level of practical knowledge and judgment that we
all need to help us live in a reasonable and safe way’6
This can be understood as shared understanding, and
understanding that has been made on common grounds
and is acceptable for all. ‘Common grounds’ means a
meeting between parties that may differ in their interests
and values but who are willing to negotiate them. This is
precisely the condition for common acceptance and trust.
How to Make Common Sense of Vaccines?
For scientists, this means that there are several tasks in
the science-society interface. First, there is the responsi-
bility to establish an effective science communication
about what is known, what is unknown and what re-
mains uncertain and to what extent. Secondly, the sci-
entific community should prove its commitment to the
scientific ethos by its quality of communication with the
public: through accountability, transparency and open-
ness, including their own motives and interests. The
Asilomar conference in 1975 serves as a source of
inspiration in that respect; an example of how scientific
initiatives can inform the public and prevent misconcep-
tions from stifling scientific progress [10]. In addition,
scientists must be aware that we are now living in an era
in which trust must be earned and in which the public
does not accept claims to knowledge simply because
they are made by scientists. This development is a fact,
for better or for worse.
Research on Public-Science Dialogues
Bean [11] provides a useful overview of concerns voiced
at anti-vaccine web sites. We use these questions to begin
1 http://time.com/46914/vaccine-opponents-wrong/, Retrieved
May 29, 2014.
2 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/upshot/vaccine-
opponents-can-be-immune-to-education.html?_r=2,, Retrieved
May 29, 2014.
3 h t t p : / / c o n t e n t . t ime . c om / t ime /maga z i n e / a r t i c l e /
0,9171,1968100,00.html,, Retrieved May 29, 2014.
4 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jenny-mccarthy/whos-afraid-of-
the-truth_b_490918.html,, Retrieved May 29, 2014.
5 http://www.wired.com/2009/10/ff_waronscience/all/, Retrieved
May 29. 2014.
6 http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/common-
sense. Retrieved May 22, 2014.
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the informed dialogue of the RASVaccine, in addition to
two socio-cultural communication techniques.
Decisions by members of the public on what science
is ‘good’ and what science is ‘bad’ are not and cannot be
solely based on facts; values, ideals of what is useful or
important for an individual, are at least as significant.
Values also refer to a person’s sense of behavioral, moral
and ethical norms. Values can be a result of a person’s
cultural identity. Kahan et al. [12: 148] put forward a
definition of ‘cultural cognition’: ‘the tendency of indi-
viduals to fit their perceptions of risk and related factual
beliefs to their shared moral evaluations of putatively
dangerous activities.’ In other words, scientific debates
may become discredited if a person or social group
perceives the debate as grounded in an ideal or value
culture with which they do not agree. For example, if the
people with whom I identify and who are important to
me think the world is flat, I, too, will adopt that belief,
despite facts that prove otherwise, to maintain my social
status and avoid social dissonance among my peers.
Kahan [13] outlines two approaches to societal de-
bates that are polarized by cultural cognition and
disconsensus. The first, based on the research of Cohen
et al. [14], is to ‘present information in a manner that
affirms rather than threatens people’s values’ and the
second, ‘to make sure that sound information is vouched
for by a diverse set of experts’ [13: 297].
Why do We Need Common Sense of Vaccines?
Vaccines have become so routine in modern life that their
significance for public health may easily be forgotten. Two
centuries of scientific research and vigorous prophylactic
inoculation programs laid the foundation for the eradica-
tion of the disfiguring and deadly disease smallpox (1979)
[15] and the control of the spread of polio [16–18],mumps,
measles, rubella and other contagious diseases. [19–22].
With the current rate of progress in molecular biology, it is
likely that the repertoire of effective vaccines will continue
to expand. It is important therefore, that novel vaccine
technologies be introduced on ‘common grounds’.
The successful introduction of new promising vac-
cines depends upon a lot more than science. More than
most technologies, vaccines require acceptance on a
collective level, since the objective is disease control
in the population. Collective acceptance and legitimacy,
however, is a factor that cannot be taken for granted in
vaccination programs or indeed any other emerging
biotechnology. To gain insight into this matter, we
review some of the sources of public trust and distrust
and discuss scientists’ responsibilities with regard to
trust. We suggest a road ahead by indicating how a more
dialogical form of science communication might bridge
gaps of understanding and create shared perspectives
upon – a ‘common sense’ of – vaccines.
The public debate about the perceived risks of vac-
cines is contentious and scientists point to current com-
munication on vaccines as potentially counterproductive
[23, 24]. How can we as scientists begin to understand
the core issues such as public trust and values as we
participate in this debate? This paper is the product of a
collaboration between scientists studying the ethical,
legal and social impacts (commonly known as ELSI)
of new technologies and those scientists involved in the
design and creation of these new technologies; to be
specific, a new type of vaccine that is embedded in the
DNA of a bacteria. This paper has two parts in the goal
of defining a ‘common sense’ of the public concerns and
actual risks of vaccines. First, the ELSI scientists from
the University of Bergen put forward arguments in a
focus group of vaccine scientists on why scientists and
the public need to make a ‘common sense’ understand-
ing of new technologies that will have a societal impact.
The ELSI scientists proposed 7 specific questions with
which the public is likely to be concerned. Then the
vaccine scientists from Arizona State University
responded to these questions in an effort to make com-
mon sense of their specific research product, a Recom-
binant Attenuated Salmonella Vaccine (RASV) to pre-
vent pneumonia. Thus, this paper represents one exam-
ple of many possible avenues of public-science dialogue
developed through interdisciplinary collaboration.
Method
To address this issue, we focus on information about the
RASVaccine using Bean, Cohen et al. and Kahan’s
insights in an example of scientists responding to the
public. Since RASV is a live, Salmonella-based vaccine,
it should not come as a surprise if lay people might
distrust the RASV. Rather than a public misunderstand-
ing of science, this is established common sense. For the
public, the obvious question that follows is: how can a
bad bug possibly become a good bug? This is on one
hand a question about the scientific competence and
ethos, which has to be displayed as transparency and
willingness to communicate the science in accessible
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language. On the other hand, common sense should be
established on a societal level: motives, purposes and
values informing the research, as well as needs, con-
cerns and other issues voiced by publics and citizens.
This will be the point of departure for dialogue.
The ELSI researchers reviewed the literature for
primary references that describe the public in rela-
tion to perceptions of science through values.
From this review, we represent the ‘public’
through five questions that people who visit anti-
vaccine websites have had [11]: 1) What is the
need for the RASV? 2) What are some alternative
treatments? 3) What are the safety issues? 4) Who
profits from the RASV? 5) How would the RASV
affect my civil liberties? In addition, one question
referring to Cohen et al. [14] that affirms the value
of trust 6) Why should I trust the scientists work-
ing on these things? and finally a question refer-
ring to Kahan [13] that addresses a broad-backing
from experts and relate them specifically to the
Recombinant Attenuated Salmonella Vaccine: 7)
How can I know that the public health institutions
are doing their best for me and my safety? During
a 3-week in-lab visit by the ELSI researchers from
the University of Bergen in October 2010, the
ELSI researchers mediated a series of ‘dialogue
sessions’ on various ELSI topics in which the
RASVaccine scientists were interested. In collabo-
rations after the in-house visit, these seven ques-
tions were put forward to RASVaccine researchers
by the ELSI researchers. Consensus answers from
scientists are provided and discussed in the sec-
tions below.
What is the Need for the RASV?
Infectious diseases are rampant throughout the develop-
ing world. The goal of the RASVapproach is a low cost,
oral (needle-free) vaccine designed to induce long last-
ing immunity.
RASV is special because it stimulates all three arms
of the immune system, humoral (antibodies), mucosal
and cellular, while while injectable vaccines are very
efficient at stimulating humoral immunity, but are typi-
cally poor at stimulating cellular and mucosal responses.
One of the scientists in the author team expressed it as
follows: ‘RASVs are very inexpensive to manufacture,
with expected costs to be less than $0.50 a dose’ [25: 9].
(The authors note that deploying the vaccine into the
field - e.g. transportation and cold chain requirements -
would necessarily add additional costs.) Our goal is to
make the vaccine available to local manufacturers in the
developing world willing to make only a small profit.’
What are Some Alternative Treatments?
There are many needle-based vaccines available in the
US and Europe that can be used to prevent diseases
prevalent in the developing world, such as BCG for
tuberculosis and conjugate vaccines and pneumococcal
polysaccharide vaccines for bacterial pneumonia. The
cost of these vaccines is heavily subsidized to make
them affordable in the developing world [26]. An alter-
native to disease prevention by vaccination is treatment
with inexpensive antibiotics/antimicrobials. However,
bacteria can rapidly develop resistance to such com-
pounds [27]. Additionally, this would require a major
shift in policy from drug manufacturers and govern-
ments to invest in the production of novel antimicrobials
[28]. There is little economic incentive to do this and
many pharmaceutical companies have ceased research
to discover and develop new antimicrobial agents, with
the exception of anti-viral agents [29].
What are the Safety Issues?
Salmonella Typhi can cause diseases such as typhoid
fever. Many of the genes necessary for virulence have
been identified. The current RASV is an S. Typhi strain
that has 10 different mutations designed to eliminate the
ability of Salmonella to cause disease and related symp-
toms of discomfort [30] and to enhance its ability to
induce a protective host immune response.
Other safety concerns have guided the construction
and design of the RASV. These include bio-containment
of the vaccine, such that it does not spread from the
patient receiving the vaccine, transfer of exogenous
genes from the vaccine strain to the natural gut flora,
and potential inoculation of immune compromised
individuals.
One of the side-effects that can occur with live atten-
uated vaccines is a back-firing, or reversion to virulence.
Reversion is the standard boogeyman for live vaccines.
To address this concern, we use complete gene/operon
deletions to make the odds of reversion extremely small.
Another danger is that a live vaccine will be able to
interact with other microbes in the host and/or environ-
ment and either pass traits to them or acquire new
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abilities from them (thus altering vaccine behavior).
While theoretically possible, based on what we know
about the frequency of gene transfer, the possibility of
this happening with our RASV strains, containing mul-
tiple genetic alterations, is statistically insignificant.
The safety of newborns, infants, pregnant mothers,
the elderly, malnourished, people infected with HIV or
M. tuberculosis or who are or otherwise immunocom-
promised is also an important issue. These groups can be
particularly at risk and may respond differently to
RASV than normal, healthy adults.
Given these risk and safety issues, which may be the
sources of public trust in the RASV? We will point at
three sources that we think provide a good point of
departure for dialogue. First, as scientists we have to
demonstrate our moral commitment to the safety of our
vaccine. Perhaps our main contribution to the public
debate is to express our commitment and show our
efforts to design our strains and our pre-clinical and
clinical studies to address these issues.
Secondly, we have to claim expertise and explain its
basis in the institution of peer review. While there is no
direct way one can know whether a particular scientist
can be trusted, what we can put on the table are the
reasons to believe in science as institution. Peer review
has its problems and is not a truth machine; the philo-
sophically informed reason to support it is basically that
there is no better alternative.
Finally, there are the governmental institutional
mechanisms of protective regulatory protocols to en-
sure the safety of the public and test the safety of
the vaccine. For instance, one has to obtain preclin-
ical and phase I, phase II, and phase III data on the
specific population in order to satisfy the FDA’s
rigorous standards as described. To make common
sense around the safety issues would then mean to
discuss in good faith our claims of expertise and
moral commitment, and the reasons for believing in
FDA and similar institutions.
Who Profits from the RASV?
Our goal is prevention and eradication of infectious dis-
eases for human and animals. Local governments and
communities can also profit monetarily and socially. By
decreasing the disease burden in developing countries, we
can create a healthier, more efficient and productive work-
force. This would lead to a healthier environment by
reducing the environmental loads of targeted pathogens.
The eventual vaccine manufacturer will also profit
from the RASV, since if they don’t make some sort of
profit, it is unlikely they would want to manufacture the
vaccine. Since RASVs are relatively inexpensive to
manufacture compared to injectable vaccines, our goal
is to facilitate the availability of the vaccine to local
manufacturers in the developing world willing to make
only a small profit. The Gates Foundation has covered
all of the RASV research costs7 to date, including pre-
clinical studies and a Phase I trial, thereby reducing the
initial research and development costs to the eventual
manufacturer. This also encourages investment in the
technology while keeping the profit margin to a mini-
mum with the explicit distribution condition that the
vaccine be available to all at very low or no cost.
How Would the RASVAffect Civil Liberties?
As mentioned above under Safety Issues, one problem
with any live vaccine is that it can be spread through the
population [31]. This can work out well, since you can
get herd immunity (protection of unvaccinated individ-
uals from contagious diseases due to the vaccination of a
significant amount of surrounding individuals) without
having everyone come in to the clinic, but it also means
that those who shouldn’t be vaccinated (people who are
at-risk for adverse reaction) and those who don’t want to
be vaccinated could accidentally be exposed. Ethical
standards now require informed consent. One scientist
we’ve talked to on this issue stated: ‘I would consider it
a civil liberties violation if I was given a drug I did not
wish to receive without my consent, so I don’t think
RASVs should be considered differently.’
Given the premise of a safe and efficacious vaccine,
civil liberties would be less of an issue. Rather, vacci-
nation would then be seen as a civic duty to protect
oneself and one’s fellow citizens, on par with washing
one’s hand when working in a kitchen or a hospital. In
other words, common sense around civil liberties is
intrinsically linked to the issue of safety.
Why Should I Trust the Scientists Working on These
Things?
Let us first say why we trust our fellow scientists. In the
research and academic world, there are a number of
7 (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Grand Challenges in Global
Health grant 37863)
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checks and balances that are designed to build trust. All
scientists developing vaccines must satisfy the FDA’s
requirements before their vaccine can be licensed for
use. Academic scientists are obliged to have their work
evaluated by peer review before publication in academic
or medical journals. We can never know for sure wheth-
er a particular scientist is trustworthy, but in general we
do trust published peer-reviewed sources more than
sources that do not use such checks (e.g. webpages,
blogs, non-academic books).
We cannot, and nobody can, demand that others
should trust us. Trust has to be earned and built through
interaction. The reason to enter into dialogue is not to
provide reasons why people should stop thinking for
themselves and trust others. Rather it is to provide
reasons that promote a mutual understanding that de-
velops into trust - promote a common sense between
previous opponents.
How Can One Know That the Public Health Institutions
Care for Citizens’ Safety?
Because public health policy is carried out by gov-
ernment agencies, they may be linked to a public
distrust of government. Violations such as Tuskegee
syphilis experiment [32] must be reminders that
such distrust is not unfounded. While current stan-
dards for the use of human subjects in clinical trials
include many safeguards covered in the Code of
Federal Regulations Title 21 - informed consent,
Institutional Review Boards and independent over-
sight committees8 - communication between the sci-
entific and lay communities must be consistent and
transparent. This requires a scientifically literate
electorate and a dedication by scientists and policy
makers to engage in outreach programs.
As in any situation, trust is earned through past
deeds and accomplishments. To bolster public trust
and to ensure the safety of volunteers, there are
stringent requirements regulations during a vaccine
clinical trial. Firstly, there is informed consent. Any-
one in the study must be informed to the benefits
and risks of the experimental procedures. Secondly,
research is overseen by an independent internal reg-
ulatory board (IRB) made up of scientists, medical
experts and members of the general public. These
boards approve the design of the study and protect
volunteers against violations of federal regulations.
Lastly, an independent data and safety monitoring
board (DSMB) reviews the safety information col-
lected during the course of a clinical trial, and de-
cides whether to continue a trial or halt it to protect
the volunteers.
Conclusions
This text operates on three important levels. First, we
reflect on the need to improve the science-society dia-
logue in the realm of vaccines. Then, we give concrete
examples of this dialogue by outlining legitimate ques-
tions from the public and answering them in our capac-
ity as scientists in an effort to create a ‘common sense’
of the specific type of vaccine that we work with.
Finally, we offer this approach to our science peers as
one example of how to meet the public on highly
contested topics like vaccines. Public trust in new tech-
nologies is needed in order to attain socially robust
science and we encourage scientists to do their part
and openly engage with the public in this two-way
street.
We feel this paper is an important contribution to the
literature as a guide to present information from the
realm of biotechnology towards the public realm as a
first step in making a ‘common sense’ of a technical
object. As such, we hope the result of our ELSI-
RASVaccine collaboration closes the communication
gap Kahan [13] refers to by acknowledging and address-
ing cultural cognition and values of the public as a
springboard to structuring an otherwise polarized and
unpredictable debate about biotechnical products.
The philosopher Karl Popper expressed an essential
scientific virtue in his saying: ‘I may be wrong and you
may be right, and by an effort we may get nearer to the
truth.’ Although misinformation may have dominated
several of the vaccine controversies [33, 34], it remains
a scientific responsibility to be open to the possibility
that the critics and dissidents can be right the next time.
We should also appreciate that it may require time and
effort to understand their real concern.
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